Abstract-Information security is a top priority in government and industry because high consequence cyber incidents continue with regularity. The blue teamers that protect cyber systems cannot stop or even know about all these incidents, so they must take measures to tolerate these incursions in addition to preventing and detecting them. We propose dynamically compartmentalizing subject networks into collaboration zones and limiting the communication between these zones. In this article, we demonstrate this technique's effect on the attacker and the defender for various parameter settings using discretetime simulation. Based on our results, we conclude that dynamic cyber zone defense is a viable intrusion tolerance technique and should be considered for technology transfer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Government agencies and corporate enterprises make information security a top priority because of cyberspace's hostility. The Dyn domain name system (DNS) distributed denial of service (DDoS), San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency ransom, WannaCry pandemic, Petya attack and Equifax personally identifiable information (PII) spill demonstrate that cyber events are not decreasing in frequency or impact.
Cyber security groups cannot stop or even know about all these events, so they must provide a defense in depth that includes an intrusion tolerance layer. We propose dynamically dividing subject networks into zones based on business needs and limiting the traffic that flows between these zones. We demonstrate this technique's effect on the attacker and the defender for various parameter settings using discrete-time simulation. This approach can be considered a moving target defense (MTD).
Our threat model comprises four key points: First, we assume that we face a sophisticated state or criminallysponsored adversary. Next, we assume that an insider threat is present. Third, we assume that this insider must move laterally to their final objective. Finally, we assume that they must reach back to their command and control (C2) node.
Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International, Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. Now we visualize the dynamic cyber zone defense use cases in three figures. Figure 1 shows a human identifying a business need for hosts a and b to communicate freely. A host can be any endpoint on the subject network: for example, a workstation, server, printer or scientific device. This human will submit a request to the Zone Manager (ZM). The ZM collects these requests across the enterprise and fulfills them. The ZM can fulfill these requests on an event-driven basis: for example, fulfilling every request as it arrives. Alternatively, the ZM can do this periodically: for example, every night at midnight. To fulfill each request, the ZM assigns the two hosts to the same zone. Generally speaking, a zone is a network partition; layer 2 (e.g., passive optical network (PON)) and layer 3 (e.g., Internet protocol (IP)) are the most obvious places to effect the zone boundaries. However, this work is not specific to any layer or protocol. Figure 2 shows the ZM enforcing one facet of security policy: limiting the number of zones a host belongs to. This figure shows host c's zone membership and includes a timestamp indicating the last time host c used each zone. The security policy limits each host to two zones, so the ZM reduces host c's zone count. Specifically, the ZM removes host c from zone 4 because host c used this zone least recently. Like the previous use case, the ZM can perform this function asynchronously or periodically. Figure 3 shows the ZM enforcing a different aspect of security policy. In this case, it limits the number of hosts that belong to a zone. Specifically, the ZM reduces zone 6's membership to three hosts; it removes host f from zone because host f used this zone least recently. Like the previous use cases, the ZM can do this asynchronously or periodically. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: First, Section II surveys the state of the art for this topic. Next, Section III proposes an algorithm to solve the problem at hand. Third, Section IV describes the discrete-time simulation that we instrumented to study this technique. Next, Section V presents numerical data and figures that quantifies and visualize the performance of this implementation of dynamic cyber zone defense. Finally, Section VI concludes the article by summarizing our contributions in the study and identifying future lines of investigation.
II. LITERATURE SEARCH
In this section, we survey the contemporary work related to dynamic cyber zone defense.
Mitchell, et al. wrote three papers which propose increasingly intricate closed-form mathematical models that predict how static cyber zone defense affects attackers in [5] , [4] , [6] . Our investigation studies dynamic cyber zone defense and researches the impact to the defender as well as the attacker.
Earlier, we wrote an article proposing dynamic cyber zone defense [2] . However, this work did not include any attacker-
for r ∈ r do z ← find smallest zone(Z)
18:
end if end for 25: end function facing metrics; all the measurements related to the impact this technique would have on the defender. Also, this earlier approach arbitrarily removed humans and hosts from zones. In the present work, we provide two attacker-facing metrics and use business-related criteria for deciding what hosts to remove from zones.
III. ALGORITHM

A. Implementation
In this section, we propose dynamic cyber zone defense algorithms and analyze their runtime complexities. In terms of notation, the boldface variables are vectors, and the capital variables are sets in Algorithms 1 through 4.
As discussed in Section I, the ZM can invoke Algorithm 1, fulfill hosts(), periodically or on an event-driven basis. This algorithm accepts two parameters: r is the list of requests that the ZM has pending. Each request comprises two components; r 0 and r 1 are the two hosts for which there is a business need to be in the same zone. In terms of notation, r x .Z indicates the set of zones that r x is a member of. The other parameter is Z which is the set of all zones that the ZM administers. When invoked, fulfill requests() begins by iterating over the list of requests. If the two hosts that comprise the request are the same or if the two hosts are already members of the same zone, Algorithm 1 proceeds to the next request. Otherwise, if at least one of the two hosts is in a zone, fulfill requests() finds the smallest zone that either of them belongs to and adds the other host to this smallest zone. Otherwise, Algorithm 1
while |h.Z| > mzph do 3: z ← least recently used zone(h)
h.Z ← h.Z − z for z ∈ Z do 3: devalue zone(z) 4: end for 5: end function finds the smallest zone overall and adds both hosts to this smallest zone. Finally, this algorithm devalues each host. One optimization is to devalue only the hosts added to a zone, but we trade conceptual compactness for this optimization.
During its execution, Algorithm 1 invokes Algorithm 2, devalue host(). This algorithm accepts one parameter: h is the host to be devalued. A host that is a member of too many zones is a high value target, so we refer to the process of removing it from some zones as devaluing the host. Algorithm 2 repeats the following steps until h belongs to an acceptable number of zones: (mzph, the maximum zones per host, defines this acceptable number.) First, devalue host() finds the zone z that h used least recently. In terms of notation, z.H indicates the set of hosts that belong to z. Next, this algorithm removes h from z.H. Finally, Algorithm 2 removes z from h.Z.
As discussed in Section I, the ZM can invoke Algorithm 3, enforce zonepolicy(), periodically or on an event-driven basis. This algorithm accepts one parameter: Z is the set of zones that the ZM administers. Algorithm 3 iterates over all the zones in Z, and it invokes devalue zone() for each zone z.
During its execution, Algorithm 3 invokes Algorithm 4, devalue zone(). This algorithm accepts one parameter: z is the zone to be devalued. A zone to which too many hosts belong is a high value target, so we refer to the process of removing some hosts from it as devaluing the zone. Algorithm 4 repeats the following steps until an acceptable number of hosts (mhpz, the maximum hosts per zone, defines this acceptable number) belong to z: First, devalue zone() finds the host h that least recently used z. Next, this algorithm removes h from z.H. Finally, Algorithm 4 removes z from h.Z.
B. Analysis
Now we analyze the worst-case runtime complexity of Algorithms 1 through 4.
In the worst-case scenario, each request that fulfill requests() processes comprises two hosts that are not a member of a zone. Hosts may not be a member of a zone if they are rarely-used servers, for example. While processing each of these worst-case requests, Algorithm 1
while |z.H| > mhpz do 3: h ← least recently used host(z)
end while 7: end function iterates over two host zone-sets to calculate their intersection (line 5), the set of all zones to find the smallest zone (line 17), two host zone-sets to calculate unions (lines 18 and 19) and one zone host-set to calculate a union (line 20). This algorithm will also incur the runtime of devalue host() twice per request in the worst case.
In the worst case, for every zone that the host is a member of (line 2), Algorithm 2 iterates over the host zone-set once to find the least recently used zone (line 3), the zone host-set once to remove the host (line 4) and the host zone-set a second time to remove the zone (line 5).
Therefore, the worst-case runtime complexity of devalue host() is:
This means the worst-case runtime complexity of fulfill requests() is:
Therefore, Algorithm 1 runs in quadratic time with respect to the number of zones and in linear time with respect to the number of requests and hosts. For each zone, enforce zone policy() invokes devalue zone(). In the worst case, for every host that is a member of the zone (line 2), Algorithm 4 iterates over the zone host-set once to find the host that least recently used the zone (line 3), iterates over the zone host-set a second time to remove the host (line 4) and iterates over the host zone-set once to remove the zone (line 5). Therefore, the worst-case runtime complexity of devalue zone() is:
This means the worst-case runtime complexity of enforce zone policy() is:
Therefore, Algorithm 3 runs in quadratic time with respect to the number of zones and with respect to the number of hosts. 
IV. SIMULATION
We began with the simple framework we used for [3] , [6] . Next, we integrated our extensions to [2] . Finally, we added the enhancements we propose in this paper. The instrumentation is a SimPy [1] artifact with three classes: a Network singleton, an active ZM singleton and an active Host class that is instantiated many times. The Network singleton is passive; it serves as a container for the simulation's objects, attributes and utility methods. The ZM singleton is active; it contains implementations for the request fulfillment and policy enforcement algorithms described in Section III and invokes them once every 24 hours of simulation time. The many Host objects are active; they bill charge numbers, create zoning requests and, if they are infected, attempt to compromise other hosts. This timecard information is the criteria by which the algorithms determine the least recently used zone. Once every 24 hours of simulation time, the Host objects choose the number of charge numbers to bill and the charge numbers themselves based on a uniform distribution. The Host objects create a zoning request for the ZM based on an exponential distribution, but choose the requested host based on a uniform distribution. Infected Host objects choose a host to attempt to spread to based on a uniform distribution, and nature determines if these attempts are successful based on a uniform distribution. We make three assumptions in the simulation: there is a one-to-one correspondence between cyber zones and charge numbers, we cannot create new zones and there is a one-to-one correspondence between humans and hosts. Table I lists the parameters that constrain our discrete-time simulation. p c is the probability that an arbitrary host in the subject network is compromised. p r is the probability that an arbitrary host in the subject network can reach back to its C2 node. To reach back, the host must be compromised and have visibility to a compromised externally-facing host. d is the number of disruptions hosts experience during the simulation. A disruption occurs when the ZM removes a host from a zone in the process of devaluation (cf. Algorithms 2 and 4. p e is the probability that an arbitrary host in the subject network is exploitable. Mitchell and Sery provide a technique to estimate p e in [4] . z is the maximum zone size. This will be lower for a highly compartmentalized network and higher for a flatter network. n is size of the entire subject network. x the number of externally-facing hosts on the subject network. This will be lower for a cyber-physical system (CPS) that is mostly populated with sensors, actuators and control units. x will be higher for an enterprise network that is mostly populated with attended commodity devices. Φ is the porosity of the zone boundaries. [4] also provides a technique to estimate Φ. λ is the mean request interval. This will be lower for highly dynamic workplaces with new collaborations forming frequently and higher for more static workplaces and industrial control systems (ICSs).
V. RESULTS
This section visualizes the numerical results the discretetime simulation produced in Figures 4 through 11 . We also interpret the trends these figures show. Figure 4 shows the impact of the maximum zone size and the probability that an arbitrary host is exploitable on the probability that an arbitrary host is compromised. This figure shows that both z and p e are directly related to p c , which is how we want the algorithm to behave because this means that smaller zones comprising less exploitable hosts are more secure. Also, p e amplifies the effect of z on p c : When p e = 0.1, p c 's range is only 0.019; on the other hand, the range is 0.141 when p e = 0.9, which is almost an order of magnitude increase. Figure 5 shows the impact of the maximum zone size and the probability that an arbitrary host is exploitable on the probability that an arbitrary host can reach back to its C2 node. This figure shows that both z and p e are directly related to p r , which is how we want the algorithm to behave because this means that smaller zones comprising less exploitable hosts are more secure. Figure 5 shows that p e amplifies p r in the same fashion it does to p c . Figure 6 shows the impact of the maximum zone size and the interzone porosity on the probability that an arbitrary host is compromised. This figure shows that both z and Φ are directly related to p c , which is how we want the algorithm to behave because this means that smaller zones with less porous boundaries are more secure. In contrast to p e , Φ attenuates the effect of z on p c . When Φ = 0.1, p c 's range is 0.148; on the other hand, the range is only 0.052 when Φ = 0.9. Figure 7 shows the impact of the maximum zone size and the interzone porosity on the probability that an arbitrary host can reach back to its C2 node. This figure shows that both z and Φ are directly related to p r , which is how we want the algorithm to behave because this means that smaller zones with less porous boundaries are more secure. Figure 7 shows that Φ attenuates p r in the same fashion it does to p c . Figure 8 shows the impact of the maximum zone size and the mean request interval on the probability that an arbitrary host is compromised. This figure shows that while z is directly related to p c , λ appears unrelated. This is how we want the algorithm to behave: Smaller zones are more secure, but the rate of new collaborations should not impact security. Figure 9 shows the impact of the maximum zone size and the mean request interval on the probability that an arbitrary host can reach back to its C2 node. This figure shows that while z is directly related to p r , λ appears unrelated. This is how we want the algorithm to behave: Smaller zones are more secure, but the rate of new collaborations should not impact security. Figure 10 shows the impact of the maximum zone size and the externally-facing host count on the probability that an arbitrary host can reach back to its C2 node. This figure shows that both z and x are directly related to p r , which is how we want the algorithm to behave because this means that smaller zones with fewer Internet gateways are more secure. Also, Figure 10 shows that while p r is sensitive to x, its effect diminishes as x grows. While the gap between the curves for x = 8 and x = 16 is clear, the gap between the curves for x = 32 and x = 32 is less distinct. Figure 11 shows the impact of the maximum zone size and the mean request interval on the number of disruptions. This figure shows that both z and λ are inversely related to distraction count, which is how we want the algorithm to behave because this means that larger zones with less frequent new collaborations are less disruptive for the defender. Also,
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we make three basic contributions. First, we propose an MTD intrusion tolerance technique based on dynamically assigning hosts in a network to cyber zones and restricting the traffic flow between these zones. We also provide a reference implementation for this technique. Finally, we study how dynamic cyber zone defense impacts the attacker and defender using a discrete-time simulation.
There is a substantial list of enhancements we look forward to making to this work. First, we will consider a ZM that batches requests and finds zone assignments that are minimally disruptive. We will also collect real data regarding patterns of human and host collaboration to replay in our simulation. Third, we will relax assumptions that we make in the discretetime simulation: we will allow the ZM to create new zones, we will allow many-to-many relationships between zones and charge numbers and we will allow many-to-many relationships between humans and hosts.
